* Introduction: Who Are We? How The Embodied Mind Challenges The Western Philosophical Tradition * The Cognitive Unconscious * The Embodied Mind * Primary Metaphor and Subjective Experience * The Anatomy of Complex Metaphor * Embodied Realism: Cognitive Science Versus A Priori Philosophy * Realism and Truth * Metaphor and Truth The Cognitive Science Of Basic Philosophical Ideas * The Cognitive Science of Philosophical Ideas * Time * Events and Causes * The Mind * The Self * Morality The Cognitive Science Of Philosophy * The Cognitive Science of Philosophy * The Pre-Socratics: The Cognitive Science of Early Greek Metaphysics * Plato * Aristotle * Descartes and the Enlightenment Mind * Kantian Morality * Analytic Philosophy * Chomskys Philosophy and Cognitive Linguistics * The Theory of Rational Action * How Philosophical Theories Work Embodied Philosophy * Philosophy in the Flesh
George Lakoff is professor of linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley, and the coauthor, with Mark Johnson, of Metaphors We Live By. He was one of the founders of the generative semantics movements in linguistics in the 1960s, a founder of the field of cognitive linguistics in the 1970s, and one of the developers of the neural theory of language in the 1980s and '90s. His other books include More Than Cool Reason (with Mark Turner), Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, and Moral Politics.Mark Johnson is professor and head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Oregon and is on the executive committee of the Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences there. In addition to his books with George Lakoff, he is the editor of an anthology, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor.
Written by distinguished Berkeley linguist Lakoff and his coauthor on Metaphors We Live By (1983), this book explores three propositions claimed as "major findings" of cognitive science: "The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical." Cognitive science, with its basic materialist bent, applies computer-based concepts, a little neurophysiology, and linguistic theory to human mental life. It will, the authors say, drastically change philosophy. They seem to think that we are really run by our deep wiring and the cultural concepts that become embodied metaphors. While seeking clarity by drawing out the implications of their basic notions, they add new puzzles. What does it mean to say "reason is not disembodied"? Read this book to see how (some?) cognitive scientists think. But read it with Charles P. Siewert's recent The Significance of Consciousness (Princeton Univ., 1998) for the traditional notions of consciousness. Readers will find there's still room for their own judgments.‘Leslie Armour, Univ. of Ottawa, Canada