1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability.
This book provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming.
Rakesh V. Vohra is the John L. and Helen Kellogg Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, where he is also Director of the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. He previously taught at the Fisher School of Business, Ohio State University and is the author of Advanced Mathematical Economics (2005). Professor Vohra has also completed a manuscript on the principles of pricing with Lakshman Krishnamurthi, Professor of Marketing at the Kellogg School. Professor Vohra received his doctorate in mathematics from the University of Maryland.
'The new book by Vohra is an excellent and most timely introduction
into mechanism design. It offers a concise introduction to the
theory of mechanism design, currently missing in the literature; it
uses linear programming to great benefit to analyze the structure
of incentives; and it provides a comprehensive account of the
seminal results in auction and mechanism design. A splendid
treatment for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in
economic theory!' Dirk Bergemann, Yale University
'Rakesh Vohra's exposition of the theory of mechanism design is
wonderfully transparent and elegant. This short book equips the
reader with a remarkably deep and comprehensive understanding of
this important subject.' Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan
'Vohra convincingly demonstrates that linear programming can give a
powerful and unified perspective on mechanism design, clarifying
the ideas and methods underlying existing results, and leading in
many cases to greater generality or new findings. Graduate
students, researchers in other areas, and experienced mechanism
designers will all benefit from this book, which will influence
mechanism design research for years to come.' Andrew McLennan,
University of Queensland
'Professor Vohra's rigorous text is unique in showing how numerous
central results in mechanism design can be unified using the
methodology of linear programming. His treatment is elegant and
original, and it touches the most recent research frontiers.' Benny
Moldovanu, University of Bonn
'Rakesh Vohra takes the reader from the basics of social choice
theory and network flow problems to a deep understanding of optimal
incentive systems for complex resource-allocation problems, using
the mathematics of linear programming elegantly throughout the
book.' Roger Myerson, University of Chicago and 2007 Nobel
Laureate
'By situating the fundamental questions of social choice, incentive
compatibility, and auction design within the theory of linear
programming, Vohra is able to address the modern themes of
mechanism design in a cohesive manner. The result is inspiring,
enjoyable, and extremely compelling.' David Parkes, Harvard
University
'This beautiful book provides an insightful and useful treatment of
the fundamental theorems of social choice and mechanism design from
the unifying and powerful perspective of linear programming. A
terrific read covering a broad range of topics including a serious
and rare treatment of multidimensional mechanism design.' Phillip
J. Reny, University of Chicago
'The book does not assume any prior knowledge of mechanism design,
but requires some familiarity with game theory, linear programming
and convex analysis. As such, it is well suited to students and
graduates of economic courses, but also to researchers and
experienced mechanism designers.' Vangelis Grigoroudis,
Zentralblatt MATH
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