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Terence Roehrig provides a detailed and comprehensive look at the nuclear umbrella in northeast Asia in the broader context of deterrence theory and U.S. strategy. He examines the role of the nuclear umbrella in Japanese and South Korean defense planning and security calculations, including the likelihood that either will develop its own nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is most important as a political signal demonstrating commitment to the defense of allies and as a tool to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Extended Deterrence and the Nuclear Umbrella
2. The Nuclear Umbrella and Extended Deterrence During the Cold War
3. The Threats That Drive the Nuclear Umbrella: China and North Korea
4. Japan and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella
5. South Korea and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella
6. The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Planning, Capabilities, and Credibility
7. Implications for Security and Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index

About the Author

Terence Roehrig is professor of national security affairs and director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the U.S. Naval War College. His books include The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea (2001); From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea (2007); and, with Uk Heo, South Korea Since 1980 (2010) and South Korea's Rise: Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Relations (2014).

Reviews

Terence Roehrig offers an excellent evaluation of extended-deterrence strategies, bringing together theory and policy in their historical context in a readable fashion. -- T. V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University