CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
PART I: Antecedents
R. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’
A. Alchian (1950), ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’
L. McKenzie (1951), ‘Ideal Output and the Interdependence of
Firms’
F. Modigliani (1958), ‘New Developments on the Oligopoly Front’
G. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’
K. Arrow (1963), ‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care’
H. Simon (1962), ‘The Architecture of Complexity’
PART II: The New Economics of Organization
M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz (1976), ‘Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information’
B. Holmstrom (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’
J. Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of
Collusion in Organizations’
G. Akerlof (1983), ‘Loyalty Filters’
O. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractural Relations’
S. Grossman and O. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and lateral Integration’
P. Joskow (1985), ‘Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts:
The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants’
B. Klein and K. Leffler (1981), ‘The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractural Performance’
PART III: Strategic Behaviour and Competition
H. Demsetz (1974), ‘Two Systems if Belief about Monopoly’
A. Dixit (1980), ‘The Role of Investment in Entry-deterrence’
P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to
Entry’
P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1980), ‘Limit Pricing and Entry Under
Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis’
D. Kreps and R. Wilson (1982), ‘Reputation and Imperfect
Information’
D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole (1984), ‘The Fat-Cat Effect, The
Puppy-Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look’
W. Baumol, J. Panzar and R. Willig (1986), ‘On the Theory of
Perfectly-contestable Markets’
S. Salop (1979), ‘Monoplistic Competition with Outside Goods’
Edited by the late Oliver E. Williamson, formerly Professor, Graduate School and Edgar F. Kaiser Professor Emeritus of Business, Economics, and Law, University of California, Berkeley, US and 2009 Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics for Studies of Economic Governance
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