The Logic of Collective Action
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Table of Contents

Introduction I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations A. The purpose of organization B. Public goods and large groups C. The traditional theory of groups D. Small groups E. "Exclusive" and "inclusive" groups F. A taxonomy of groups II. Group Size and Group Behavior A. The coherence and effectiveness of small groups B. Problems of the traditional theories C. Social incentives and rational behavior III. The Labor Union and Economic Freedom A. Coercion in labor unions B. Labor-union growth in theory and practice C. The closed shop and economic freedom in the latent group D. Government intervention and economic freedom in the latent group IV. Orthodox Theories of State and Class A. The economists' theory of the state B. The Marxian theory of state and class C. The logic of the Marxian theory V. Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups A. The philosophical view of pressure groups B. Institutional economics and the pressure group--John R. Commons C. Modern theories of pressure groups--Bentley, Truman, Latham D. The logic of group theory VI. The "By-Product" and "Special Interest" Theories A. The "by-product" theory of large pressure groups B. Labor lobbies C. Professional lobbies D. The "special interest" theory and business lobbies E. Government promotion of political pressure F. Farm cooperatives and farm lobbies G. Noneconomic lobbies H. The "forgotten groups"--those who suffer in silence Index

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There is now a considerable body of literature which attempts to apply economic analysis to political problems. In my opinion, Olson's is one of the most successful and provocative of these attempts Olson's central insight is novel and illuminating to political scientists and he shows that by the use of it he can give familiar facts (about labor unions, farm organizations, and other interest groups) new meaning. I believe that his work is going to force the jettisoning of much of what has been said about interest groups and the revision of the rest. It should also have an influence on the many political scientists who work in the field of organization. -- Edward C. Banfield, Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Urban Government, Member of the Faculty of Public Administration, Harvard University

Reviews

The existence of a large group with a common interest does not automatically give rise to collective action. There must be an individual incentive to join in or there must be compulsion. This proposition, together with the notion that small groups are qualitatively different from large ones, forms the core of this extremely stimulating book… The range of phenomena it helps to explain and the number of existing ideas it overthrows are very considerable. Having set out his theory of groups and organizations…the author demonstrates its explanatory power by examining the growth of trade unionism, the concept of economic freedom, Marx’s class theory, orthodox theories of pressure groups, special interest groups and, lastly, the unorganized groups. Economic analysis is blended with political theory and sociology with great success. The result is an important contribution to social science.
*The Economist*

Olson’s book is a significant and valuable contribution to the economist’s attempt to come to grips with organizational problems.
*American Economic Review*

This superb little volume is worthy of the attention of all social scientists. It can lead to a healthy and challenging discussion and perhaps to a reappraisal of pressure groups in American society.
*Public Opinion Quarterly*

There is now a considerable body of literature which attempts to apply economic analysis to political problems. In my opinion, Olson’s is one of the most successful and provocative of these attempts. Olson’s central insight is novel and illuminating to political scientists and he shows that by the use of it he can give familiar facts (about labor unions, farm organizations, and other interest groups) new meaning. I believe that his work is going to force the jettisoning of much of what has been said about interest groups and the revision of the rest. It should also have an influence on the many political scientists who work in the field of organization.
*Edward C. Banfield, Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Urban Government, Harvard University*

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