Contents: Foreword; Preface; Introduction; USAir 1016 - windshear encounter; TWA 843 - the power of suggestion; American 1572 - accumulation of small errors; American International 808 - the strobe light that wasn't there; Southwest 1455 - unstabilized approach at Burbank; FedEx 14 - pilot-induced oscillations in the landing flare; Ryan 590 - a minute amount of contamination; Tower 41 - loss of control during a slippery runway takeoff; Continental 1943 - gear-up landing in Houston; American 102 - runway excursion after landing; Continental 795 - high-speed takeoff decision with poor information; USAir 405 - snowy night at LaGuardia; ValuJet 558 - 2 missing words and a hard landing short of the runway; Air Transport International 805 - disorientation, loss of control and the need to intervene; American 903 - loss of control at altitude; Simmons 3641 - over the gates and into forbidden territory; American 1340 - autopilot deviation just prior to landing; Delta 554 - undershot landing at LaGuardia; American 1420 - pressing the approach; Flightcrew-related accident data: comparison of the 1978-1990 and 1991-2001 periods; Converging themes: the deep structure of accidents; Bibliography; Index.
Dr Dismukes is Chief Scientist for Human Factors in the Human Factors Research & Technology Division at NASA Ames Research Center. His current research addresses cognitive issues involved in the skilled performance of pilots, their ability to manage challenging situations, and their vulnerability to error; prospective memory; and management of attention in concurrent task performance. Captain Berman is a senior research associate at San Jose State University/NASA Ames Research Center and flies the Boeing 737 for a major air carrier. He is the former Chief of Major Investigations of the U.S. National Transportation Board, where he previously led the Operational Factors Division, served as a member of the major accident go-team responsible for flight operations, and managed safety studies. Dr Loukopoulos is a Senior Research Associate at NASA's Human Factors Research and Technology Division. She currently resides in Athens, Greece where she serves as a human factors consultant to the Greek Air Accident Investigation and Safety Board and where she served on the Helios Airways 2005 accident investigation. She also continues her collaboration with NASA through the San Jose State University Foundation.
'The authors do not, however, argue that human error is just part of the price of doing business - it must still be reduced, and to be reduced, the factors associated with it must be understood as well as possible, which is the aim of their study.' AeroSafety World, May 2007 'Overall, this is an excellent and innovative text which reflects the authors' original approach to airline safety. The book is outstanding in its identification of common themes that run deeper than in previous analyses of aviation safety, and the final chapter contains clear, pragmatic guidance to the air transport and to researchers. In the final sections of the book, the authors sum up the central challenge faced by the industry in reducing vulnerability to error: pilots should be given more information, better interfaces and clearer decision-making guidance - backed up by prioritizing adherence to that guidance over commercial pressures such as on-time performance. The book will be informative for diverse readers in the air transport industry, including operational staff, researchers, safety analysts, accident investigators, designers of systems and procedures, training providers and students.' Ben Daley, Manchester Metropolitan University - Review Submitted to Amazon.com 'The Limits of Expertise challenges how we think about accidents and pilot error. From details of recent accidents, the authors argue that while pilot error is often concluded as cause, we should expect many operators similarly situated to make comparable decisions and take equivalent actions. From that perspective, individual actions and errors are not the source of accidents but a result of systemic causes. This reframing provides good news - managers and regulators can act at system levels to prevent many future accidents.' Tom Chidester, Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, USA 'This is not a Michael Crichton thriller, but those familiar with aviation will easily be able to follow the details as they are stated in factual, non-judgmental manner, and will see into the deep causes of the events that led up to the final accident. Readers who are already familiar with aviation terminology will find the book easy to read (do you know what "LOFT" and "windshear" mean?). At the end, the very helpful glossary covers both aviation and cognitive psychology terms so that readers of all levels of industry expertise or interest can enjoy this useful study.' Association for Aviation Psychology Newsletter, Sept 07 'The book is likely to be of interest to several audiences. Certain chapters may be excellent accompanying material for introductory or advanced Human Factors courses. Also, many human factors and safety professionals may find reading the book rewarding - the reports are well written and clear, even for people without aviation background. Technical concepts are explained in a glossary at the end of the book. The concluding chapter provides some insights and analyses, even though it does not constitute (and probably does not aim to be) a major theoretical proposition. Perhaps the most important aspect of the book, which makes it valuable reading for human factors professionals, is the very realistic depiction of actual operations in a complex environment. Rarely does one have the opportunity to obtain such close looks at the reasoning and actions of highly skilled professionals, such as airline crews. ' Human Factors & Ergonomics Newsletter, no2/2007 'I strongly endorse this text as a companion to the primary texts used in courses in Human Factors in Aviation or Crew Resource Management. As I prepared my syllabus for an upcoming CRM course, I found this text, reviewed it and then added it as a supplementary text to my primary CRM text...Key Dismukes ...said that he and the other authors had intended their text to be used in this unique way.' Todd P. Hubbard, International Journal of Professional Aviation Training & Testing Research 'It's usefulness and appeal may ...seem to be limited to those in aviation industries, but this is not the case. It is valuable to safety practitioners and theorists in general, particularly those in the field of human factors, and the management lessons that it draws from its many accident studies are instructive to managers in all sectors' Safety Critical Systems Club Newsletter 'The authors argue that human error should be seen as an indication of "system vulnerability" rather than pilot inadequacy. Fortunately there are many ways in which managers and regulators can improve the system to help avoid future accidents. The book is packed with techniques by which individual pilots can reduce their vulnerability to error and thereby improve their chances of reaching retirement unscathed. A fascinating read for pilots, managers, regulators and anyone interested in operations at the limits of human expertise.' The Log, BALPA, 2008 'It is not often that one finds a book that so admirably combines scientific theory and practical operations analysis. The authors do so with insight and integrity, and both professionals and the general public would be well served if more books such as this were available.' Ergonomics in Design, Spring 2008