Table of Contents

Acknowledgements Synopsis 1: The Background 2: Procedural Rationality and Belief Ascription 3: Epistemic Rationality and Belief Ascription 4: Agential Rationality and Belief Ascription 5: Beliefs and Self Knowledge 6: Conclusions Bibliography and Reference List

About the Author

Lisa Bortolotti is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham (UK). Her main research interests are in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences and in the intersection between philosophy of mind and ethics. She has published a number of articles on belief ascription, rationality and delusions in journals such as Mind & Language and Philosophical Psychology. She is the author of An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science for Polity
Press, the editor of Philosophy and Happiness for Palgrave and the co-editor (with M.R. Broome) of Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives for Oxford University Press.

Reviews

`This book is an important contribution to the recent delusion debate. The book can also usefully work as a cognitive science textbook on delusion. The author introduces the topic in depth, covering all the right issues in a way that no one has done before. The bibliography is also an extremely rich guide for those interested in further exploring the subject, and also for finding sources relevant to disputes in the philosophy of mind.'
Elisabetta Sirgiovanni, HumanaMente
One of the most important works on delusions is Bortolotti's Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, a book that examines the core features of delusions in relation to other mental states, demonstrating that many non-delusional beliefs are not so rational and delusions often differ in degree, rather than kind, from other, non-pathological, beliefs.