Table of Contents

Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction: The Six-Day War and the Mystery of Arab Military Ineffectiveness 1. Pattens of Arab Military Performance Part I: Soviet Doctrine
2. The Soviet Way of War 3. Arab Militaries and Soviet Doctrine 4. North Korea, Cuba, and Soviet Doctrine Part II: Politicization
5. Politicization 6. Arab Militaries and Politicization: Egypt 7. Arab Militaries and Politicization: Iraq 8. Politicization and the South Vietnamese Armed Forces 9. Politicization and the Argentine Armed Forces Part III: Underdevelopment
10. Economic Development and Military Effectiveness 11. Economic Development and Syrian Military Effectiveness 12. Economic Development and the Libya-Chad Wars 13. Economic Development and Chinese Military Effectiveness 14. Economic Development and Arab Military Effectiveness Part IV: Culture 15. War and Culture 16. Arab Culture as an Explanation for Military Ineffectiveness 17. Aab Culture: Patterns and Predilections 18. Arab Culture and Arab Military Effectiveness 19. Arab Culture and Civilian Organizations 20. Culture and Education: The Causal Link 21. Arab Military Training Methods 22. Exceptional Arab Militaries: State Armed Forces 23. Exceptional Arab Militaries: Nonstate Armies Conclusions: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness Notes Selected Bibliography Index

About the Author

Kenneth M. Pollack was a longtime Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution, where he ran the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and is currently a Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise Institute.

Reviews

"A masterful, wide-ranging, compelling study of why Arab armies have typically fared poorly in combat. With this certain-to-be classic work, Ken Pollack solidifies his position as one of the world's foremost scholars on Middle Eastern military and political affairs." -- General David Petraeus (US Army, Ret.), former Director of the CIA
"Ken Pollack argues convincingly that efforts to uncover causes of military success or failure must begin far from the battlefield. He shines new light on social, economic, political, and cultural impediments to improving military effectiveness in Arab states. His argument that the influence of culture is predominant is certain to generate introspection among Arab leaders and their overseas partners who support their military reform efforts. This should be read
and debated by readers who want to understand better this complex and important region." -- H.R. McMaster, Former National Security Advisor and author of Dereliction of Duty
"Few if any military analysts know as much, or have thought as deeply, about Arab armies as has Ken Pollack. In Armies of Sand-a masterpiece of political science-he distills a lifetime of learning to grapple with the most important and most difficult questions that lie at the intersection of technology, culture and politics. Essential reading for anyone interested in understanding the dynamics of warfare in the Middle East." -- Max Boot, author
of Invisible Armies
"Armies of Sand belongs in the library of every military professional serving in the Middle East, whether Western or Arab. It is a unique blend of military history and social science that comprehensively explains the military effectiveness of our Arab friends and foes alike. Pollack has courageously and objectively tackled the sensitive subject of culture, which we ignore at our peril. Armed with its insights, future commanders might avoid the
surprises and frustrations that have long been the hallmarks of military operations in this theater of persistent conflict." -- Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army (Ret.); Commander of Coalition forces in
Iraq and Syria, 2015-2016
"This is a path-breaking volume on an uncomfortable topic: Arab military failure. Kenneth Pollack is the model of the engaged scholar, whose extensive field experience on today's battlefields complements his knowledge of military affairs and the Arab world more broadly. The volume is lucid, comprehensive and fascinating. His conclusions about the relationship between culture and military effectiveness will be controversial, but they are compellingly put and
will set the terms of debate for years to come." -- Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins-SAIS