This work examines how electoral laws, the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of governments, and the nature of competition between political parties influence unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and monetary and fiscal policy. The book presents both a thorough overview of the theoretical literature and a considerable amount of empirical evidence. A common belief is that voters reward incumbents who artificially create favourable conditions before an election, even though the economy may take a turn for the worse immediately thereafter. The authors argue that the dynamics of political cycles are far more complex. In their review of the main theoretical approaches to the issues, they demonstrate the multifaceted relationships between macroeconomic and political policies. They also present a broad range of empirical data, from the United States as well as OECD countries. One of their most striking findings is that the United States is not exceptional; the relationships between political and economic cycles are remarkably similar in other democracies, particularly those with two-party systems.

About the Author

Alberto Alesina is Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economics at Harvard University. He is the coauthor (with Enrico Spolaore) of The Size of Nations (MIT Press, 2003).

Reviews

"This book is an important achievement in Political Economy, by two of the most creative researchers in the field. The ideas here, developed over many years by Alesina and Roubini, have already stimulated considerable new research and important empirical findings. This book deserves a wide readership."--Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, Harvard Institute for International Development; Galen L. Stone Professor of International Trade, Department of Economics, Harvard University